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Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality
of Executing the Innocent
SusAN BANDESt

In 1960, Charles Black wrote an elegant, witty and powerful
response to critics of Brown v. Board of Education,1 particularly
addressed to Herbert Wechsler's famous article Toward Neutral
Principles of ConstitutionalLaw. 2 Wechsler had lamented that although he believed the desegregation decisions would make an enduring contribution to the quality of our society, he had serious
doubts whether the decisions rested on neutral legal principles, in
the absence of which the decisions could have no legitimacy.
Black responded that indeed these decisions could be justified,
through reasoning which might be difficult to accept because it was
so unsubtly, unfashionably simple.$ The equal protection clause
forbids using the laws of the states to significantly disadvantage
blacks. Segregation is a massive intentional disadvantaging of
blacks by state law. How do we know this? His words bear
repeating:
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set
up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station,
and if the question is then solemnly propounded whether such a race is
being treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign
4
prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter.

Black was describing the situation in which a startlingly obvious principle can't seem to find legal recognition. In Black's words,
it is obvious to everyone, including the Justices as individuals, that
t Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. Visiting Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, Spring 1996. I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky, Barry
Friedman, Alan Goldberg, Hal Krent and Larry Marshall for their comments on an earlier

draft, and to Jeffrey Barclay, Michael Laureano, Amy Nord and Jay Spatzek for their research assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the SegregationDecisions,69 YALE L.J. 421

(1960); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAnv. L.
REv. 1 (1959). Both Wechsler and Black addressed not only Brown v. Board, but the group
of desegregation decisions handed down in the years 1954 to 1959.
3. Black, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 424.
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segregation intentionally fosters inequality for blacks., If there is
no ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, can
learn this, "legal acumen has only one proper task--that of developing ways to make it .permissible for the Court to use what it
knows; any other counsel is of despair."'
Upon reading Herrera v. Collins,7 I was struck by the aptness
of Black's response, and by its relevance to the question posed by
Herrera.Another startlingly obvious principle, which has difficulty
finding legal recognition, is that the judicial system should not participate in the execution of innocent people. When a doctrine permits a result so far removed from our collective sense of justice, it
is time to re-examine that doctrine.
At this point, of course, numerous complications, limitations
and hedges begin to crowd in. Much depends on the way the proposition is phrased, and, however it is phrased, there are those who
will take issue with it. But Charles Black slightly overstated his
proposition too."
All hedging aside: the question presented in Herrera was
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution prohibit the execution of a person who is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.9 If a negative answer
to this question is solemnly propounded, I suggest that laughter is
an appropriate response.
Specifically, Herrera held that federal habeas corpus is not
available merely to hear claims of actual innocence, because habeas
is a vehicle only for the adjudication of constitutional claims. The
Court rejected Herrera's contention that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution are violated by executing
an actually innocent person without providing a forum for hearing
the newly discovered evidence which bears on his claim of innocence.' 0 Under Herrera, therefore, a claim of innocence is not a
5. Id. at 427.
6. Id. at 428.

7. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
8. It was not obvious to all that segregation intentionally fostered inequality-indeed,
this was one of the premises Wechsler questioned. Wechsler said:
In the context of a charge that segregation with equal facilities is a denial of
equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if 'enforced separation stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority' it is solely because its
members choose 'to put that construction upon it'?

Wechsler, supra note 2, at 33.
9. 506 U.S. at 398.
10. Chief Justice Rebnquist's majority opinion assumed for the sake of argument that
"in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial
would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." 506 U.S. at 417. Justices
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constitutional claim and must be accompanied by an independent
allegation of unconstitutionality to be cognizable on habeas.1 1
This Article argues that the execution of an innocent person
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. There can be no
sufficient constitutional justification for taking innocent life.
Therefore, when a petitioner seeks to present newly discovered evidence tending to prove his innocence, he is entitled to a forum for
presentation of that evidence. Such a forum is a necessary procedural safeguard against the deprivation of innocent life. Since the
execution of an innocent person, standing alone, ought to be considered a violation of the Constitution, it should be cognizable on
habeas corpus without the need to allege an additional constitutional violation.
Part I argues that executing the innocent is unconstitutional
and that courts must provide a forum for the consideration of
newly discovered evidence likely to demonstrate actual innocence.
Part II demonstrates that current law, especially in light of Herrera, is inadequate to protect the actually innocent from execution.
Part III examines some of the remedial issues raised by the right
to present newly discovered evidence.

I.

THE RIGHT

To

PRESENT NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

The argument for a right not to be executed when innocent
raises difficult definitional issues. Guilt and innocence, in the legal
context, can have meaning only to the extent there is a procedure
for their determination.1 2 "In state criminal proceedings the trial is
the paramount event for determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendant."13 Upon conviction, the defendant loses the presumption of innocence. In what sense, then, can a convicted person be
termed actually innocent?
The universe of claims of actual innocence after conviction can
O'Connor and Kennedy concurred, asserting that there is a fundamental legal principle that
executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution, but that Herrera was not innocent. Id. at 419. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred, asserting that had the question been
decided, the answer would have been that there is no right to judicial consideration of newly
discovered evidence of innocence after conviction. Id. at 427-28. Nevertheless, they joined
the entirety of the Court's opinion. Justice White concurred, assuming that a persuasive
showing after trial of actual innocence would render the petitioner's execution unconstitutional, but finding that Herrera had not made such a showing. Id. at 429. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter dissented, arguing that the execution of an innocent person vio-

lates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 431-41.
11. 506 U.S. at 400.
12. Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins, The Gateway of Innocence for Death-Sentenced
PrisonersLeads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 946 (1994).
13. Herrera,506 U.S. at 416.
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be divided into three categories. First, there are claims that the
evidence presented at trial did not establish the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. This article will assume that such
claims are adequately addressed by Jackson v. Virginia,14 which
held that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief "if it is
found that upon the record of evidence adduced at the trial no
rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."15 The second category of claims of innocence concerns defaulted issues. The petitioner in this category argues that
an issue which could have been presented at trial but was not
presented ought to be part of a federal court's consideration on
habeas corpus. The issue will be cognizable on habeas if the petitioner can demonstrate that there was good cause for the procedural default at trial and that prejudice would result from the denial of habeas review. 6 Alternatively, he may make a showing,
under Murray v. Carrier,that the defaulted constitutional claim
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.
The third category, and the one on which this Article will focus, consists of claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence-evidence that had not been discovered at the time of trial
and could not have been presented in any other forum.18 The question Herreraleft open is whether a capital petitioner may raise on
federal habeas a claim that newly discovered evidence tends to
14. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
15. Id. at 324.
16. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991).
17. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995). The
Murray v. Carrierstandard for actual innocence raises some of the same problems posed by
Herrera, since, like Herrera, it requires a separate constitutional error to accompany an
actual innocence claim. Herrera itself raised, not a default issue, but the issue of when a

successive habeas petition may be filed without running afoul of the "abuse of the writ"
standard. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (discussing principles to be used

by lower courts when reviewing successive applications for habeas corpus). McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), held that though the abuse of the writ concept is generally governed by the cause and prejudice standard, there is an exception where the constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See also
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (also holding there is an exception to the cause and
prejudice standard). Nevertheless, the issue of defaulted claims is complex, and will not be
addressed here. For excellent treatments of the default issues, see, e.g., Daniel Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARv. L. REv.1128 (1986); Robert Cover &
Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977).
18. Herrera's newly discovered evidence was time barred since he had discovered it after the thirty day limitations period for filing a motion for new trial under Texas law and no
state collateral remedies existed. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406-07, 393 (1993).
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prove he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, where he has no separate constitutional claim to accompany
his claim of innocence.

The answer is, as Charles Black would say, unsubtly and unfashionably simple. This Article argues that the execution of an
innocent person is unconstitutional under both the due process
clause and the Eighth Amendment. 19 To safeguard against the
wrongful deprivation of life, these constitutional provisions require
an adequate forum for the consideration of newly discovered evidence tending to demonstrate the innocence of a capital petitioner.
This right to present newly discovered evidence in support of
claims of innocence exists independent of the presence of any additional constitutional violation in the conduct of the defendant's
trial. Therefore it is cognizable on federal habeas corpus.
For the sake of argument, this Article assumes that the hypothetical petitioner can make a sufficient threshold demonstration
of actual innocence. 0 Certainly there will be questions about the
proper threshold for the showing of actual innocence, 21 and the

threshold ought not to be set so high that it may thwart exercise of
19. I posit that it is also unconstitutional to imprison a noncapital defendant who has
been denied a forum for presentation of newly discovered evidence demonstrating the likelihood of his innocence. Most, but not all, of the arguments supporting the right in capital
cases apply in noncapital cases as well. Further discussion of this issue is outside the scope
of this article.
20. Herrera's claim was extremely weak-a poor vehicle for raising the actual innocence
issue. Herrera was convicted based on eyewitness identification and substantial physical evidence, including a note written by petitioner which strongly implied that he had committed
the crime. 506 U.S. at 394-95. His newly discovered evidence consisted of two affidavits
claiming that petitioner's deceased brother had admitted committing the crime. 506 U.S. at
392-96. An example of a case which would clearly meet the threshold is People v. Cruz, 643
N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994), in which the newly discovered evidence consisted of the credible
confession of another man, Brian Dugan, that he had killed the deceased, as well as DNA
evidence consistent with Dugan's guilt and Cruz's innocence. See also Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty, L.A. Tams, Nov. 1, 1992 (Magazine), at 18 (a detailed description of the Cruz
story).
21. Various formulations have been suggested for defining the threshold a petitioner
must meet to introduce newly discovered evidence. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 ("a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'made after trial would render execution
of a defendant unconstitutional... [but] the threshold showing for such an assumed right
would necessarily be extraordinarily high"); id. at 420-21 (White, J., concurring) (whether,
based on the newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the convicting jury, the
petitioner can prove by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (petitioner
must show that he probably is innocent); Eric Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the
Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposalsfor Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence
in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315 (1990-91) (because of new
evidence bearing on guilt, excusably discovered since trial, there is now probable cause to
believe that a new jury might reach a different outcome).
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the right.22 However, my focus here is not on defining the precise
contours of the remedy, but on establishing that the right does exist and that an effective remedy is required for its effectuation.
A.

The Due Process Clause

In Herrera,the Justices argued about whether the petitioner's
claim for habeas relief was grounded in a right to substantive or
procedural due process. Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument was as
follows, "The question before us . . . is not whether due process
prohibits the execution of an innocent person, but rather whether
it entitles petitioner to judicial review of his "actual innocence"
claim. This issue is properly analyzed only in terms of procedural
'23
due process.
Chief Justice Rehnquist accused Justice Blackmun of putting
the cart before the horse for assuming that the petitioner was innocent;24 Justice Blackmun, in turn, accused Chief Justice Rehnquist
of putting the cart before the horse for denying the petitioner the
opportunity to bring his actual innocence claim because a jury had
previously found him guilty. 25 Rather than attempt to resolve the
horse versus cart debate, I suggest that the right is so fundamental
that it easily meets the standards for both procedural and substantive due process. 2 6 More accurately, in this particular context, the
horse/cart split is misleading. The right has, inextricably, both
substantive and procedural elements.
The execution of an innocent person should be held to violate
substantive due process because it is an unconstitutional deprivation of life. It is unconstitutional to deprive a person of life without
sufficient justification. It is difficult to imagine a sufficient justification for depriving an innocent person of his life. The principle of
substantive due process is that a law adversely affecting an individual's life, liberty or property is invalid, even though offending
no specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental objective. As the Court said in Schlup v.
22. See The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 109 HAav. L. Rav. 259, 264 (1995).
23. 506 U.S. at 406 n.6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 435 n.5 (Blackmaun, J., dissenting).
26. In other words, at the risk of oversimplifying, whether the claim was that it is unconstitutional to execute innocent people, or whether it is unconstitutional to execute people without first affording a hearing to determine their guilt or innocence.
27. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Michael J. Perry, Abortion,
the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 699-700 (1976).
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Delo2 8 "The quintessential miscarriage of justice is the execution
of a person who is entirely innocent. Indeed, concern about the
injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has
long been at the core of our criminal justice system. '29 The government can have no legitimate justification for executing an innocent
person. To execute a person known to be innocent, as Justice
Blackmun said, "comes perilously close to simple murder." 8°
Chief Justice Rehnquist's point in response to the due process
argument in Herreracan be characterized in two ways: (1) that we
can never know whether the petitioner is actually innocent, since
he is not entitled to a hearing, or (2) that legally, he can never
again be considered innocent, since he has already been convicted.
As to the first characterization, Rehnquist observed in Herrera
that "the trial is the paramount event for determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant."31 Moreover, there is no established
constitutional right to direct appeal from a conviction.3 2 (It should
be noted, however, that in the capital context the constitutionality
of state death penalty statutes has been predicated on the existence of such review). 8 Thus Rehnquist's argument appears to be
that the petitioner has received all the process he is due and therefore we can never reach the issue of his substantive entitlement to
life. Rehnquist's argument may seem merely tautological: there is
no entitlement to more process because no more process is due.
But it reflects an implicit balancing of those factors-finality, fairness, administrative convenience-which underlie the due process
determination. The particular balance for which the majority argues is hard to defend. Given the overriding importance of the
right at stake, the government must provide adequate procedures
to ensure that arbitrary deprivations do not occur. Thus the substantive due process right not to be executed when innocent must
28. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).

29. Id. at 866.
30. 506 U.S. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. 506 U.S. at 416.
32. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (holding that states need not provide appellate review of criminal convictions). But see Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REv. 503 (1992) (evaluating arguments in
support of the right to a criminal appeal); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension
Clause: Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?92
MICH. L. Rnv. 862 (1994) (arguing that such a right exists); 1 JAMES S. LiEBmAN & RANDY
HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2.4e, at 74 n.313 (2d ed. 1994)
(also arguing that there is a right to appeal a conviction that resulted in incarceration).
33. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303, 371, 389
n.347 (1993) [hereinafter Steiker, Innocence].
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be accompanied by procedures to enable innocence to be demonstrated. The existence of newly discovered evidence creates a situation in which the trial could not have provided a full and fair hearing on all the relevant factual and legal issues. This is an elemental
procedural due process problem, and one which does not require
grappling with the difficult issue of a right to appeal or other corrective process. When evidence is newly discovered after trial, the
right to present it is akin to a first trial or a first factfinding hear4
ing, rather than a review of another factfinder's determination.1
Although there is some question of the appropriate procedural
due process test to apply in a post-conviction context,"5 the choice
of test is unimportant. Under either test, the same factors are being weighed: the innocent petitioner's interest in not being executed, the danger of erroneous deprivation-which is by definition
extremely high-and the state's interest in finality. The result
under either test must be a finding that denial of the opportunity
to present evidence which could prevent such erroneous deprivation of life is a violation of due process. The weight of the petitioner's interest in not being arbitrarily deprived of his life is so
fundamental that it easily outweighs the costs of providing additional process. The substantive right not to be executed if innocent
is empty unless accompanied by a procedural means of determining innocence.
At this point the first characterization folds into the second:
that legally, the petitioner can never again be considered innocent,
since he has already been convicted. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist or
Justice Scalia would disagree with the above balancing, and would
34. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1976) (holding that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949) (state must
give defendant at least one opportunity to raise constitutional claims); Case v. Nebraska,
381 U.S. 336, 337 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring); 1 LmeMm & HERTZ, supra note 32, § 7.1b
n.48. But see Lewis v. Casey, 1996 WL 340797 (holding in Bounds that inmates have a right
of access to the courts is still good law, but the court cautions against construing the right
too broadly-for example, there is no abstract right to a law library or legal assistance).
35. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437
(1992). The Mathews three part test weighs the private interest that will be affected by the
official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and the Government's interest, including the function involved and the burdens entailed by the substitute procedures. 424 U.S. at 335. Medina held that when criminal processes are under scrutiny, courts should find them lacking only when they offend some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 505
U.S. at 445-46. Justice Rehnquist's citation of Medina seems to confirm that the Court will
use this test, rather than the Mathews test, to assess the adequacy of post conviction procedures as well as trial procedures. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407. See also Steiker, Innocence,
supra note 33, at 373-74 (accord).
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argue that the principle of finality is so important that it simply
defines what is "enough" procedure, and outweighs the importance
of ensuring that an innocent person not be executed.3 6 Procedural
due process balancing tests necessitate weighing values like finality, administrative convenience, and the right not to be arbitrarily
executed, and they provide no inherent criteria for assigning relative values. 3 7 Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist observed, Mathews v.
Eldridge and similar balancing tests promote ad hoc, subjective
judgments of the underlying interests at stake.3 8 More to the point,
balancing tends to put all interests on the same plane, thereby
weakening the force of fundamental guarantees.3 9
How, then, can it be determined whether the interest in finality ought to outweigh the right not to be arbitrarily executed? It
may be helpful to examine the finality interest more closely. The
interest in finality encompasses several overlapping concerns,
which can be summarized as judicial economy, repose, deference to
the court issuing the initial judgment, and the appearance of orderly process. 40 Many of these interests are not served by the refusal to entertain newly discovered evidence.
It is useful to consider these questions in light of Paul Bator's
article on finality in habeas corpus, 41 since that work has so profoundly influenced the habeas jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court.4 2 Bator believed that questions of ultimate fact, such as the
question of guilt or innocence, are unanswerable,'43 and that therefore great weight should be accorded to the finality of the trial verdict.44 Chief Justice Rehnquist's comment in Herrerathat there is
36. Justice Rehnquist does not seem willing to go this far, since he at least assumes

arguendo that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional. 506 U.S. at 416. However, Justice
Scalia does seem willing to accept this proposition. See id. at 427-29.
37. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
38. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
39. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. R v. 227, 295 (1990); Aleinikoff,
supra note 37, at 986-92.
40. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HiRv. L. Rnv. 441, 444-54 (1963).
41. Bator, supra note 40.
42. I do not mean to suggest that I agree with Bator's analysis, or that it commands

universal acceptance. It has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982) (critiquing the pro-

cess orientation model of habeas advanced by Bator). My point is rather that even under
Bator's stringent view of habeas relitigation, consideration of newly discovered evidence is
necessary.
43. Bater, supra note 40, at 447.
44. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
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no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination would be
any more exact at a retrial 5 reflects this attitude. Yet Justice
Rehnquist's comment is simply incorrect, as Bator would likely
have agreed. If the trial court was not in possession of material
facts bearing on the question of guilt or innocence, then its decision was not "exact," and the decision of a subsequent court in
possession of these facts would, by definition, be more accurate.
Bator said:
It is, after all, the essence of the responsibility of the states under the due
process clause to furnish a criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate his case: the state must provide a reasoned method of inquiry into relevant questions of fact and law ... If a
state, then, fails in fact to do so, the due process clause itself demands that
its conclusions of fact or law should not be respected: the prisoner's detention can be seen as unlawful, not because error was made as to a substantive
federal question fairly litigated by the state tribunals, but because the totality of state procedures did not furnish the prisoner with a fair chance to
litigate his case.,6

Bator repeatedly distinguished between relitigation of factual
and legal issues already presented to the trial court, which he generally disfavored, 7 and those situations in which no institution has
yet considered all relevant factual or legal issues.'8 The opportunity to present newly discovered evidence falls into the latter and
not the former category.
Bator was also concerned that the promise of endless reconsideration would belie the possibility of just condemnation which lies
at the heart of the criminal law. But he distinguished just condemnation from complacency, 49 and so must we. The refusal to consider new evidence relevant to guilt renders the condemnation unjust-an exercise of raw power. Prisoners who believe they are
unjustly incarcerated will not find repose in the finality of their
sentences.50 Nor, one hopes, would executing the innocent reassure
Continuity and Change in CriminalProcedure,80 COLUM. L. Rav. 436, 458 (1980).

45. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993).
46. Bator, supra note 40, at 456.
47. Note, however, that Bator did not argue against appellate review of convictions. He
recognized the possibility of "error, oversight, arbitrariness and even venality" inherent in
allowing the decisions of a single institution to go unchecked. However, he saw the major
purpose of appellate review to be the preservation of uniformity, rather than the reconsideration of factual and legal issues made by competent courts. Bator, supra note 40, at 453. See
also Arkin, supra note 32, at 567 (Bator's position leads to conclusion that the defendant
must be given at least one bite of the post-trial apple).
48. Bator, supra note 40, at 454-55, 456 & n.26.
49. Id. at 452.
50. Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on Teague v.
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society at large that justice and orderly process prevail. 51
The concern for deference to the issuing court is likewise irrelevant in the situation in which the issuing court had no opportunity to consider the evidence in question. Jackson v. Virginia52 as_
sumes a federal right to be convicted only on sufficient evidence,
and permits the reviewing court to redetermine the sufficiency issue through a review of the trial record. Herrerapresents a situation in which such a review is impossible, because not all the relevant evidence is in the trial record. What was correct or rational
at trial is no longer necessarily so. The reviewing court, therefore,
unlike the court in a Jackson situation, is not reweighing what has
already been weighed, or calling into question the trial court's original determination. If the need for independent review outweighed
concerns for deference in Jackson, the need for initial consideration of the evidence should not be problematic in a situation in
which deference is not at issue.
The sole remaining value, then, is judicial economy. Should
the Court refuse to revisit convictions in which substantial new evidence of innocence exists because of the expense, delay and inconvenience it would cause to the judicial system? 54 Once the argument reaches this point-if we are really arguing judicial economy
versus executing the innocent-what can one say? It may be time
to return to Charles Black, who might say at this juncture: "Here I
must confess to a tendency to start laughing all over again." 55 In a
talk Black gave on the subject of the death penalty, he addressed
the question of whether the state's interest in avoiding
trial-which he characterized as basically an interest in economy-is great enough that we can be willing to execute people for
not serving it. And he suggested: "[L]et us dash a little cold water
on our faces and ask freshly, 'Can we really stomach this?' 56
Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2453, 2459 (1993).
51. See Walter C. Long, Appeasing a God: Rawlsian Analysis of Herrera v. Collins and
a Substantive Due Process Right to Innocent Life, 22 AM. J. CRI. L. 215, 228-31 (1994)

(arguing that the knowledge that the system would permit mistakes leading to the execution
of the innocent would destabilize the expectations of the citizenry).
52. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
53. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993) (Jacksonreview does not extend to

matters outside the trial record).
54. For an argument raising concerns about the drain on judicial resources in the Herrera context, see Barry Friedman, FailedEnterprise:the Supreme Court'sHabeas Reform,
83 CAL. L. Rav. 485, 544 (1995). But see Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN.
L. Rav. 247, 322-23 (1988) [hereinafter Friedman, Tale of Two Habeas] (arguing that the
common law writ of habeas corpus cuts through all forms to go to the heart of a contested

incarceration, and therefore can and should accommodate claims of actual innocence).
55. Black, supra note 2, at 424.
56. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Death Penalty Now, 51 TUL. L. Rav. 429, 435 (1977).
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The Eighth Amendment

Does it violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to execute an innocent person? Quoting Charles Black
again, "The case seems so onesided that it is hard to make out
what is being protested against ....,5 Justice Blackmun must be

correct that "it is crystal clear that the execution of an innocent
person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency'.

. [and] [i]ndeed . .. with any [imaginable] standard of

decency" and that it is " 'nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering.' , It is neither evenhanded, rational nor consistent.5 9 Or as one commentator concluded with admirable understatement, execution of an innocent
would not deter other crimes.6 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist never directly engaged Justice Blackmun's Eighth Amendment argument. That is, he never refuted, or
even addressed, the contention that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute an innocent person. In fact, his response is a chilling illustration of Charles Black's general point that sometimes
lawyers and judges get so caught up in the minutiae of lawyering
as to lose sight of basic, universal human principles.6 1 Rehnquist's

sole response to the Eighth Amendment argument was to distinguish, on narrow and questionable grounds, two Eighth Amendment cases cited in Blackmun's dissent: Ford v. Wainwrighte2 and
Johnson v. Mississippi.e5 Blackmun cited these cases for the proposition that "capital defendants may be entitled to further proceedings because of an intervening development even though they
have been validly convicted and sentenced to death.

'6 4

Rehnquist

distinguished Ford on the ground that it dealt with the constitu57. Black, supra note 2, at 427.
58. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431 (1993) (citations omitted).
59. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
60. George M. Ahrend, Herrera v. Collins: Does Actual Innocence Warrant Habeas
Corpus Relief?., 29 GONz. L. Rnv. 425, 448 (1993-94).

61. For a recent discussion of this point in reference to Wechsler's article on neutral
principles, see Martha Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: JudicialRhetoric and the Literary Imagination,62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1477, 1482-86 (1995).
62. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). Ford held that where a petitioner had been validly sentenced

to death and later exhibited signs of insanity, the state of Florida was required under the
Eighth Amendment to provide an additional hearing to determine whether he was competent to be executed. Id.
63. 486 U.S. 578 (1988). Johnson held that where a petitioner had been sentenced to

death based on three aggravating circumstances, and one of these later became invalid, the
Eighth Amendment required review of the sentence because the jury had been allowed to
consider evidence that has been revealed to be materially inaccurate. Id.
64. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 433 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tionality of the sentence and not the conviction. He distinguished
Johnson on the ground that in that case, unlike Herrera, state
remedies were available to the petitioner so there was no need to
override state law. 5
In short, this is the horse and cart problem again. If there is
an Eighth Amendment right not to be executed when innocent, the
lack of a state remedy is not a problem: enforcement of the right
requires the creation of a remedy, even if this means overriding
state law. Like the substantive due process right, the Eighth
Amendment right is perfectly empty unless there is a means of establishing innocence. 8 Rehnquist suggests, without quite saying it,
that the remedial difficulties posed by revisiting capital convictions
and sentences are so onerous that they preclude recognition of the
right.8 But this just collapses into the judicial economy argument
considered earlier.
Similar problems afflict the contention that the Eighth
Amendment applies solely to the sentence and not to the conviction. It is the state which subjects the petitioner to both trial and
sentence, in this case a sentence which is irrevocable when carried
out. The sentence has no validity independent of its appropriateness in light of the crime for which it was meted out. For the state
to carry out such a sentence where a change in circumstances has
robbed it of legitimacy is an act of raw and arbitrary power. The
state has the responsibility to provide a mechanism to prevent
such occurrences, and if it fails, the federal courts must step into
the breach.
If one accepts the argument that there is a constitutional right
not to be executed when innocent, then claims of innocence become cognizable on habeas. That is, since the innocence claim is
itself a constitutional claim, it need no longer be accompanied by
an additional constitutional violation to qualify for relief on federal
habeas corpus. 68 Alternatively, states may be required to provide
adequate collateral vehicles for presentation of newly discovered
evidence. These changes are necessary, since current law is inadequate to accommodate claims of newly discovered evidence, as
65. 506 U.S. at 406. Justice Blackmun responded that the Court had considered state
practice in the Johnson case only to determine whether there was an independent and adequate state ground preventing it from reaching the merits of Johnson's claim, and not to
determine whether an Eighth Amendment violation had occurred. 506 U.S. 432 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Berger, supra note 12, at 1012.
67. See, e.g., 506 U.S. at 401 (few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-standing claims of actual innocence).
68. This is not to imply that the Court is correct in requiring an independent constitutional violation to accompany an innocence claim. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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Part II will demonstrate.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LAW

The New York Times recently told the shocking but not uncommon story of two people convicted of a murder it was now clear
they did not commit, who have no legal means to establish their
innocence and so remain behind bars. Both have been in prison in
Oregon since 1990 for the crime. Oregon courts are not required to
consider evidence discovered more than five days after imposition
of sentence, and as of the date of the Times article, the state
courts had refused to consider the corroborated confession of another man to the slaying.e And of course, according to Herrera,
federal habeas corpus relief was unavailable since the sole claim
was actual innocence, with no independent constitutional claim.
What should our reaction be when we are solemnly told that
courts are impotent to correct this outrageous state of affairs?
Even in the current cynical and intolerant climate, such situations-when they manage to command public attention-have the
power to shock"° and confound. To understand how such a situation can occur, it is necessary to view all the mechanisms comprising the criminal justice system in tandem.
Even under the best of circumstances, new evidence may come
to light after trial which materially affects the reliability of a conviction. For example, in numerous cases DNA evidence is now
available which simply did not exist at the time the defendants
were tried. 1 Or new witnesses or new physical evidence may sur69. Evidence Clears Two. The Law Doesn't. N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1995, at A28. In a

conversation with Michael E. Rose, attorney for one of the defendants-John Sosnovske-I
learned that soon thereafter the county circuit court judge granted a petition for post conviction relief, though in order to do so, the judge had to rather creatively attach the actual

innocence claim to an independent, newly minted constitutional claim. Conversation with
Michael E. Rose (Jan. 12, 1996); letter from Michael E. Rose to Susan Bandes (Feb. 2, 1996)
(on file with author). See also Lis Wiehl, Judge Frees 2 Held in Killing by Another, N.Y.
Tims, Nov. 28, 1995, at Al.
70. But see Justice Scalia's comment in his Herrera concurrence: "If the system that
has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 'shocks' the dissenters' consciences ... perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or, better still,
the usefulness of 'conscienceness-shocking' as a legal test." 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
71. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Scully, 1992 WL 32342 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (court permits peti-

tioner to present newly discovered evidence in the form of DNA fingerprinting, which did
not exist at the time of trial); Sewell v. Indiana, 592 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. App. 3d Dist. 1992)
(convicted rapist entitled to discover DNA comparisons which were unavailable at time of
trial); People v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (DNA analysis is newly
discovered evidence since not generally accepted by courts at time of trial); Commonwealth
v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (posteonviction petitioner granted request
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face which could not have been discovered earlier, despite due diligence.7 2 Moreover, the best of circumstances rarely obtain in capital cases. Witnesses perjure themselves, and the perjury is covered
up and goes undiscovered until statutes of limitations have
passed.7 - Confessions are coerced, 74 and evidence of the coercion

surfaces too late.75 Exculpatory evidence is suppressed, and the
suppression is covered up until it is too late. 6
All these problems occur in a context in which even the best
intentioned defense counsel works under conditions which make
thorough investigation difficult, including inadequate preparation
time, pitiful attorney fees, and scarce if any funds for investigation
for DNA testing as it was not available at trial). See also Don Terry, After 18 Years in

Prison, 3 Are Cleared of Murders, N.Y. TIrms, July 3, 1996, at A8 (three men who had
spent eighteen years on death row for a murder they had not committed were freed based

on new DNA evidence, witness recantations and a jailhouse confession by a man who said he
and his brother committed the crime).
72. See Michael Mello, Death and His Lawyers: Why Joseph Spaziano Owes His Life
to the Miami Herald-And Not to Any Defense Lawyer or Judge, 20 VT. L. REv. 19, 27
(1995) (discussing post trial discovery of facts surrounding hypnotism of the state's key
witness).
73. See, e.g., Honor and Trust in the Cruz Case, Ci. TRB., Nov. 6, 1995, at 12 (editorial); Eric Zorn, RecantationLends More Ammunition for Cruz's Freedom, Cm. TRe., Sept.
28, 1995, at 1; Maurice Possley, The Nicarico Nightmare; Admitted Lie Sinks Cruz Case,
Cm. TRm., Nov. 5, 1995, at 1; Alex Rodriguez & Tom Frisbie, Cruz Cop Faces Perjury
Probe, CHI. SuN-TMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at 8. These articles detail the eventual discovery, during Cruz's third trial for killing Jeanine Nicarico, that several sheriff's investigators had
perjured themselves when testifying that Cruz had confessed to the crime. See also Richard
Moran & Joseph Ellis, Too Many Innocent People are Executed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
March 11, 1989, at 14A (editorial referring to the knowing use by the prosecution of perjured testimony in the Randall Adams case). See also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THE Nnwrms 39-43 (1991) (discussing the Randall Adams case).
74. See Tara L. Swafford, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents
Are Not Executed, 45 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 603, 631 (1995) (discussing common causes of
conviction of innocents). See also John Conroy, Town Without Pity, CHI. READER, Jan. 12,
1996, at 1 (detailing ongoing incidents of police brutality and torture by members of the
Chicago Police Department).
75. See Zorn, supra note 73, at 1 (witness recants ten years after his statement implicating Cruz, claiming he was coerced into falsely accusing Cruz of murder).
76. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the discovery
that the Chicago Police routinely keep a second set of files, called "street files", containing
exculpatory evidence that they plan not to turn over to the defense, and detailing the conspiracy to conceal evidence that police knew they were charging the wrong man with rape
and murder and had wilfully failed to follow up evidence about the true perpetrator). See
also Rodriguez & Frisbie, supra note 73, at 8 (discussing suppression of police reports in the
Randall Adams case). See also 1 LmImAN & HERTZ, supra note 32, § 7.1a n.38 (noting that,
in McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), the "petitioner [was] denied relief.., and
ultimately executed despite probably meritorious constitutional claim because, at time of
initial state postconviction proceeding, counsel accepted state officials' word during discovery that they had not planted jailhouse informant in petitioner's cell, when in fact they had
done so").

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

and experts.7 7 To exacerbate matters, ineffectiveness of counsel in
capital cases is commonplace.7 8 Ineffective assistance is a one-two
punch. Not only does is raise an often insuperable hurdle to timely
discovery of evidence, the ineffectiveness claim itself often cannot
be raised on direct appeal and its full contours may not become
evident for some time.7 9 It ought to (but cannot) go without saying
that death IS different, because time passes as these endemic
problems keep evidence from coming to light, and once the sentence is carried out, there is no going back to correct error. Thus
ensuring adequate avenues for considering newly discovered evidence when it does come to light ought to be a priority. The reality
is very different.
The three possible avenues for raising newly discovered evidence are federal court, state court, and a petition to the governor
for executive clemency. Under current conditions, all are
inadequate.
A.

Federal Court

The habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), provides, in relevant part, that:
the findings of a state court [in the applicable state proceeding] shall be
presumed to be correct unless ... (2) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the State court hearing or (6) the applicant did not receive a
full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding.
77. See McFarland v. Scott, 8 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2785
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that states almost never
grant requests for funds to enable capital defense counsel to conduct investigations); Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime," But
Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis UNv. L.J. 479, 486 (1995) (discussing court appointed defense attorneys in capital cases who are given no money for expert witnesses). See
also Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants, 35 SANTA CLARA L. R.v. 535
(1995); David Heckelman, DeathRow Inmates Face Loss of Representation,Justices Warn,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 30, 1996, at 1 (discussing difficulties in funding capital
representation).
78. Bright, supra note 77, at 485; Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994);
Berger, supra note 12, at 964 n.121; Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness:The Arbitrary
and CapriciousImposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. R.v. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 797 (1986).
79. Where proof of ineffectiveness rests on evidence outside the trial record, for example in cases of failure to investigate or conflict of interests, that proof must be developed in
an evidentiary hearing. Even if the evidence is available at the time of direct appeal, it
cannot be raised on direct appeal since it is outside the trial record. Moreover, some ineffective assistance claims may arise from counsel's failure to perfect an appeal, to raise issues on
appeal, or from other conduct which may not be obvious until the appellate process is
completed.
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Townsend v. Sain8 identified those situations in which not
only was no presuniption of correctness accorded to the state finding, but the federal court was mandated to conduct an evidentiary
hearing. Townsend held that the state hearing was inadequate, and
a federal hearing mandatory, if there was an allegation of newly
discovered evidence that could not have been reasonably presented
to the trier of fact."' Thus under both 2254(d) and Townsend, an
allegation of newly discovered evidence precludes reliance on the
state judgment, since it was not based on a full and fair hearing,
and therefore mandates a federal hearing.
However, Townsend observed that the "evidence must bear
upon the constitutionality of the applicant's detention: the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of'8 a2
state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.
It was this dictum 88 that the Herrera Court essentially reaffirmed.
Herrera stands for the proposition that, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, 4 a petitioner has no right to present
newly discovered evidlence bearing on his guilt or innocence to a
federal court on habeas corpus unless it is accompanied by a constitutional claim.
As noted above, the Herreraproblem would be obviated if the
inability to present newly discovered evidence bearing on innocence was itself considered a constitutional violation, because it
would then be cognizable on habeas.8 5 But even assuming for the
moment that bare innocence claims are not constitutionally based,
the habeas statute can easily accommodate such claims, as numerous commentators have persuasively argued. As these commentators point out, habeas jurisprudence has always relied heavily on
the creation of federal common law to flesh out the contours of the
spare statute.8 6 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated
its own willingness to make guilt and innocence a crucially impor80. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
81. 372 U.S. at 313, quoted in and cited with approval in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 398 (1993) (majority opinion).
82. 372 U.S. at 317.
83. As Justice Blackmun observed in his Herreradissent, in which he referred to this
statement as "distant dictum," neither Townsend nor any other case prior to Herrera itself
had squarely faced the issue of whether the execution of an innocent person violates the
Constitution. 506 U.S. at 437.
84. The Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that in a capital case a truly persua-

sive demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue
open to process such a claim. 506 U.S. at 417.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 86.
86. See, e.g., Steiker, Innocence, supra note 33, at 309; Friedman, Tale of Two Habeas,
supra note 54, at 322-23.
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tant part of its equitable calculus in determining the availability of
habeas relief.87 Finally, commentators argue that if federal courts
have the power to hear innocence claims when yoked to unrelated
and possibly unmeritorious constitutional claims, they must have
the power to hear innocence claims when not accompanied by constitutional claims.88 Until such arguments find greater judicial acceptance, the federal courts are not available to hear claims of
newly discovered evidence.
B.

State Court

What are the state court options for a convicted person in possession of newly discovered evidence of his innocence? The first
possible avenue would be a motion for new trial. Yet as Herrera
itself documents, nearly every state requires a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence to be made within a fairly
short time period-most of them between sixty days and two
years.8 ' Exculpatory evidence may occasionally surface in the statutorily prescribed time period, but given the typical narrow window, such evidence will frequently surface too late.
The next possible line of attack is resort to state collateral
remedies. All states place significant limits on the ability to raise
newly discovered evidence collaterally, and some preclude introduction of such evidence entirely.9 0 To illustrate, I will focus on the
state of Illinois.
In 1947, in Marino v. Ragen,9 1 the Supreme Court held that
the collateral remedies offered by the state of Illinois to one who
sought to challenge a criminal conviction were merely theoretical,92
87. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
497 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991). See also Steiker, Innocence, supra
note 33, at 309-11; Berger, supra note 12, at 983-90.
88. See, e.g., Steiker, Innocence, supra note 33, at 376.
89. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 nn.8-11 (1993).
90. For example Texas at the time Herrerawas decided required a motion for new trial

to be made within 30 days of conviction, and provided no other collateral avenues for raising
newly discovered evidence, unless one places executive clemency in that category. 506 U.S.

at 441. Thereafter, in the Gary Graham case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
state habeas was an appropriate avenue for Graham's claim of actual innocence. Holmes v.
Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third District, 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994)(en banc). Oregon provides only a five day window post-trial (see supra text accompanying note 67). See also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARv. L. REv. 355, 423 (1995) (at least one death penalty state-Arkansas-has recently

abolished state collateral review of most federal claims, and many others have tightened
procedural rules).
91. 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
92. Id. at 569.
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"a procedural morass offering no substantial hope of relief,"93
"made up of entirely blind alleys, each of which is useful only as a
means of convincing the federal courts that the state road which
the petitioner has taken was the wrong one. '9 4 It therefore declined to require that the habeas petitioner exhaust state remedies.
Almost fifty years later, the situation in Illinois has, if anything, worsened.9 5 A prisoner seeking to challenge his conviction
solely on the basis of newly discovered evidence of his innocence
has no guaranteed method of raising his claim. The Illinois Habeas
Corpus Act" is narrowly interpreted to lie only to correct jurisdictional defects.9 7 The courts will not consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense,9 8 or other matters of a nonjurisdictional nature, even if premised on alleged deprivations of
constitutional rights.9 9 Coram nobis has been replaced by a statutory remedy'0 0 which has a two year statute of limitations (though
with a culpable negligence exception).'' The Illinois Supreme
Court until 1982 held, without explanation, that coram nobis

would not lie to consider newly discovered evidence, but in that

year reversed itself, again with no explanation. 102 Nevertheless,
courts frequently refuse to consider matters outside the trial record and generally refuse to conduct evidentiary hearings. 0 3 Some
04
commentators question the permanence of the 1982 holding.
93. Id. at 564.
94. Id. at 567. See also Note, Effect of the Federal Constitution in Requiring State
Post-Conviction Remedies, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1145 n.11 (1953) (discussing Marina
and post-Marino developments in Illinois).
95. Shortly before this Article went to press, the situation in Illinois improved considerably. In People v. Washington, 1996 LEXIS 189314 (Ill.), the Illinois Supreme Court relied
on the Illinois Constitution to hold that "a claim of newly discovered evidence showing a
defendant to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as a
matter of due process." Id. at 8. The impact of this is that such a claim may now be brought
under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. To the extent this renders Illinois a lessthan-ideal illustration of my point, it is nonetheless a welcome development. Moreover, it
does not undercut the basic argument that the situation which prevailed in Illinois before
today is still the situation in many states in which claims of actual innocence are difficulty
or impossible to raise.
96. kL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, §§ 5/10-101-5/10-137 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
97. John F. Decker, "Last Chance" State JudicialReview in Criminal Cases-Illinois'
CollateralAttack Remedies: A Call for a PrincipledJurisprudence,38 DEPAUL L. REv. 201
(1989).
98. People ex rel. Bassin v. Isreal, 335 N.E.2d 53, 55 (11M.App. Ct. 1975).
99. People ex rel. Shelley v. Frye, 246 N.E.2d 251 (III. 1969).
100. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-1401 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
101. People v. Berland, 385 N.E.2d 649, 663 (1978).
102. Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 433 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1982).
103. Decker, supra note 97, at 249-50.
104. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 97, at 242. Another commentator notes that the rem-
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Moreover, a bill is currently pending in the Illinois legislature to
abolish statutory coram nobis.'0 5 The minois Post Conviction
Hearing Act 08 is not intended as a means of relitigating questions
of guilt or innocence.1 07 It is currently interpreted to require an
allegation of an independent constitutional violation before newly
discovered evidence can be considered.10 8 It has a complex statute
of limitations which under no circumstances runs more than three
years.10 9 In summary, a claim of actual innocence, standing alone,
faces a confusing and daunting set of hurdles.11 0
C.

Executive Clemency

The Herrera court held that executive clemency acts as the
fail-safe in our criminal justice system. Although it recognized that

states are not required to provide this mechanism, it found that all
thirty-six states that authorize capital punishment provide for

clemency."'
Clemency is a particularly poor vehicle for consideration of
claims of newly discovered evidence of innocence. Clemency is a
matter of grace, not of right.1 12 The grant is discretionary with the
edy is most likely to lie if the elements of both perjury and newly discovered evidence are
present. RALPH RUESNER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

7.36 (2d ed. 1994).

105. H.B. 2527, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Sess. (1995). The bill seeks to amend ch.
725, § 5/2-1401, by adding the following language: "Nothing contained in this Section or in
this Article may be used to challenge a conviction or a sentence in a criminal case." H.B.
2527.
106. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, § 5/122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
107. People v. James, 489 N.Ed.2d 1350, 1353 (Ill. 1986); People v. Orndoff, 233 N.E.2d
378, 380 (Ill. 1968).
108. Under the recent decision in People v. Washington, 1996 WL 189374 (Il1.), an actual innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence is a constitutional claim and thus
cognizable on post-conviction.
109. It allows commencement of an action in the shorter of two periods: up to three
years from date of conviction, or up to six months from rendition of judgment in the direct
appeal process or the filing due dates of a petition for leave to appeal or petition for certiorari, whichever is sooner. ch. 725, § 5/122-1.
110. In People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. 1994) (see supra note 22), the defendant
had several meritorious constitutional claims, including a Bruton claim (Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (precluding admission of a codefendant's confession against the
defendant)), and a claim of the admission of irrelevant evidence. These claims led to two
reversals and remands of the defendant's case during the time the evidence against Brian
Dugan and Dugan's confession were unfolding. Otherwise there may have been no vehicle
for introduction of the evidence regarding Dugan. Moreover, evidence of perjured testimony
which completely undermined the state's claim that Cruz had confessed to the crime surfaced only during Cruz' third trial. See Zorn, supra note 73.
111. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 413 (1993).
112. 506 U.S. at 412.
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governor, 113 and the decision is rarely guided by substantive standards.114 Practices vary widely among the states. In other words
the decision whether to grant clemency is, by definition, arbitrary
and unreviewable. In real as opposed to theoretical terms, moreover, grants of clemency are increasingly rare. 11 5 These are not desirable qualities for a fail-safe remedy against arbitrary execution.
If indeed petitioners are entitled to a vehicle for consideration of
newly discovered evidence, a discretionary, standardless, unreviewable avenue like clemency cannot meet the dictates of due process.
By its very nature, clemency assumes forgiveness for an act
committed, not reassessment of guilt. The petitioner with newly
discovered evidence requires a forum for consideration of that evidence. In general, either because of statutory limitations, lack of
funding, lack of expertise or lack of interest, clemency boards are
not in the position to conduct a meaningful consideration of new
evidence." 6
Most fatal to the clemency petition's claim of fail-safe status is
the reality of political pressure. The wisdom of entrusting elected
officials with ultimate responsibility for the protection of a powerless, reviled group like capital defendants, in a political climate in
as a surefire vote-getting stratwhich ordering executions is seen
11 7
egy, hardly requires comment.
The above-quoted language from Marino v. Ragen aptly describes more than just archaic Illinois procedures. The entire postconviction criminal justice system, both state and federal, is often
little more than a series of blind alleys, a procedural morass offer113. In some states the governor shares the power with an advisory board. See Berger,
supra note 12, at 966.
114. Id. at 967.
115. Id. at 967; Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 266 (1990-91); Don Terry, Only Hours Before Execution, A Woman is Spared in Illinois, N.Y. Tmis, Jan. 17, 1996, at A10 (in his five years as
governor, this is the first time Jim Edgar has granted clemency to a death row petitioner).
116. For an excellent discussion of the limits of clemency in this context, see Henry
Pietrkowski, The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital Cases of Actual Innocence After Herrera, 70 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1391 (1995).

117. See id. at 1430 n.290 (discussing the behavior of Bill Clinton and Pete Wilson,
both of whom used the refusal to commute sentences as a campaign tool). See also Bright,
supra note 77, at 483-84 (discussing Bill Clinton's refusal to commute the sentence of the
brain damaged Ricky Ray Rector and his scheduling of the execution just before the New
Hampshire primary); Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEw YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at
105 (also discussing Clinton's role in the execution of Rector); Mello, supra note 72, at 28
(discussing Governor Lawton Chiles' remark that it is the court's job, not his job, to see to it
that the right person is being executed); Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The Role of Executive Clemency in Modem Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RiCH. L. REv. 227, 229 n.7 (1993)
(discussing governors' legitimate fear of political backlash for commutation of sentences).
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ing no substantial hope of relief to the wrongly convicted. Fail-safe
and backstop and last chance procedures fail to perform these theoretical functions, and what falls through the cracks is the supposed core issue of the criminal justice system: separating the
guilty from the innocent. Part III considers what ought to be done
to remedy this situation.
III. CLOSING THE REMEDIAL GAP

When a state like Illinois provides a confusing, contradictory
and ultimately ineffective set of collateral remedies, it is easy to
see that some judicial or legislative body needs to develop a coherent plan for reforming the situation. 118 As Joseph Hoffman and
William Stuntz recently suggested, the criminal justice system as a
whole is similarly contradictory and ineffective when it comes to
determining post-conviction innocence."1 " When the system whose
core purpose is the determination of guilt and innocence can find
no adequate post-conviction vehicle for accommodating substantial
challenges to its verdicts, skewed values are only part of the problem-albeit a large part. Another part of the problem is the ease
with which each sovereignty, and all the actors within each sovereignty, can pass the buck in a concurrent federal and state system.
Numerous scholars have argued that there needs to be some
forum for consideration of newly discovered evidence. Some have
argued that the forum ought to be in state court. For example Vivian Berger argues that capital prisoners asserting innocence on the
basis of new evidence should have a constitutional right to file a
motion for new trial or similar action in state court at any time
regardless of limitations periods. She believes state court is the appropriate place for such an action, since it will turn on the traditional sort of factfinding done by state criminal courts. She argues
that federal courts should not be required to spend their resources
second guessing the factual findings of local judges or juries on the
issue of guilt or innocence. 12 0 As I will argue shortly, there are also
arguments for favoring federal district court hearings in this
context.
My belief is that it is not crucial whether the hearing on newly
discovered evidence occurs in state court or federal court. It is crucial that it occurs in some court. To return to Hoffman's and
11S. Decker, supra note 97, at 306-28.
119. Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 S. CT.

REvIEw 65.
120. Berger, supra note 12, at 949. See also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 344-45

(Brennan, J., concurring).
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Stuntz's insight, it is important to view the entire criminal justice

system-state and federal-as a system, and not a series of independent institutions. The federal district courts in habeas cases,
however one chooses to define their precise mandate, and whether
one categorizes their function as direct or collateral review, 121 serve
a different role from federal district courts in any other type of
case. That is, they sit to review state court findings. If state corrective process is inadequate to accommodate newly discovered evidence, the federal district court may have the power to compel
states to provide adequate process to avoid the frustration of federal law. 122 In the absence of adequate state process, the federal
court has the duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing on that
evidence. 23
The federal courts do have some significant advantages when a
state criminal conviction may need to be reopened. In this context,
the federal forum may be preferable to the state, and it is certainly
an appropriate forum. I will briefly address the issue of whether
the federal forum is preferable to the state forum for consideration
of claims of newly discovered evidence. The question of whether
federal habeas can appropriately accommodate claims of innocence
was addressed earlier,1 24 and I will close by offering just a few additional thoughts on it here.
There are several good arguments for requiring a federal forum for consideration of newly discovered evidence. As a general
matter, one of the most important roles of the federal court is to
remedy unconstitutional government actions which injure individuals. It is difficult to conceive of a more serious governmental injury than the preventable taking of innocent life. More specifically,
121. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92 COLUai. L. REv. 1997 (1992).
122. Judge Skelly Wright and Abraham Soafer argued thirty years ago that if adequate
corrective process is constitutionally required, then the states may be compelled to provide
it or their failure to do so becomes a federal issue. J. Skelly Wright & Abraham D. Sofaer,
FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners:The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility,
75 YALE L.J. 895, 901 (1966). Liebman and Hertz write of the "federal habeas corpus courts'
traditional reluctance, on prudential grounds, to order state courts to hold hearings or provide otherwise unavailable procedures." 1 LmBmAN & HERTZ, supra note 32, § 7.1(b) n.48
(citing Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 170 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991), which noted that "if an evidentiary hearing is necessary in a federal habeas case to resolve a disputed factual question,
it should be held in federal district court, rather than state court"). However, as Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), indicated in the context of Section 1983 suits, state court statutes
of limitations and other procedural hurdles to remediation of federal rights may be overridden, and state courts may be required to provide a forum for federal claims.
123. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (state must afford petitioner a full
and fair hearing on his federal claim, or else federal rehearing of the facts is required).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
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death penalty cases often require controversial and difficult decisionmaking. Particularly in high profile cases, as capital cases often
tend to be, it is politically risky to tamper with a death sentence,
much less a conviction. In a case in which the newly discovered
evidence raises issues about the prior conduct of state officials,
these political risks multiply. For non-Article III judges, these risks
include loss of livelihood. This is not to suggest that elected state
judges never take such risks,125 but rather that
it is much more
126
difficult for them than for Article III judges.
Nor are the federalism concerns very pronounced in the context of newly discovered evidence. By definition, the state court
had no opportunity to consider the evidence, and therefore the
usual concerns about implied insults to state competence are inapposite.127 Moreover, as Hoffman and Stuntz point out, the controlling caselaw in the area of criminal procedure is largely federal, so
the dual sovereignty issues which arise from conflicts between state
and federal law are also less pronounced in this situation. 128 And
given that the applicable law is largely federal, the federal forum
has undoubted competence to adjudicate it.
Finally, I offer a last thought about the appropriateness of the
federal forum. When a federal habeas court determines the constitutionality of a petitioner's continued custody, its responsibility
under Article III is to dispense justice in the particular case before
125. Indeed, in the Cruz case, a state court judge did free the defendant by granting his
motion for directed verdict. See Allan Gray & Courtenay Edelhart, Judge Rules Cruz Innocent; Finally 'The Whole Case Just Fell Apart,' CH. Tam., Nov. 4, 1995, at 1; Janan Henna
& Stacey Singer, Cruz Judge Lambastes State Case; 'Sloppy Prosecutors Lectured by
Mehling', Cm. TRm., Nov. 4, 1995, at 6. Nevertheless, the spectacle of the state's attorney
and other elected officials continuing to keep an innocent man on death row year after year
rather than admit their mistakes in a high profile case is a case study in the way institutions
tend to perpetuate injustice in order to protect their own. See also Mello, supra note 72, at
44 (arguing that "the criminal justice system, and particularly prosecutors and police, never
admit they are wrong").
126. Judge Mehling, who granted Cruz's motion for directed verdict, did face political
pressures not to do so. See, e.g., Ted Gregory, Lacking "Closure" After 12 Years, Nicaricos
Blast Judge's Verdict, CH. Tam., Nov. 5, 1995, at 14; Art Barnum, DuPage Calls Cruz
Judge 'Prejudicial',CHI. Tm., Dec. 12, 1995, at 1 (discussing the DuPage County State's
Attorney's motion to remove Judge Mehling from another murder case). For general discussion of the comparison between the institutional pressure faced by state and federal judges,
see Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. RE v. 1105 (1977); Burt Neuborne,
Parity Revisited. The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797
(1995).
127. See MARTIN H. REDISH,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF

POWER 345 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the desire not to insult state courts as a component of judicial federalism).
128. Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 119, at 67.
JUDICIAL

1996]

SIMPLE MURDER

it. 12e When a federal court permits the execution of a petitioner

without considering evidence which was likely to render that execution lawless, it has, unavoidably, placed its imprimatur on a lawless execution.130 To do so, in the words of Cover and Aleinikoff:
"make[s] innocence and guilt a mockery-a euphemistic dressing
for inaction in the face of injustice." ' To discuss habeas purely in
systemic terms, focusing on federalism implications, judicial economy, floodgates, and such aggregate issues, is to ignore the narrowest, least controversial and most crucial role of the federal
courts-the duty to do justice in the individual case.

129. See generally Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 289 (1995).
130. See Bandes, supra note 50, at 2461-62.
131. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 17, at 1100.

